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1. INTRODUCTION 
The present action was brought after Plaintiff ParkWest Homes LLC 
("ParkWest") was stiffed for much of the contract price Defendant Julie G. Barnson ("Barnson") 
promised to pay ParkWest for constructing a single-family residence. Although a final judgment 
had previously been entered in ParkWest's favor against Bamson, the district court granted the 
nominee for her mortgage lender, Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
("MERS"), summary judgment voiding ParkWest's lien in the residence it built and eliminating 
all possibility of recovery by ParkWest. Moreover, all but one of the legal issues adopted in 
support of the judgment here challenged were raised sua sponte by the district court when 
issuing its memorandum decision and were neither discussed in the briefing by the parties nor 
argued on the hearing of MERS' motion. 
For the reasons discussed below, the judgment in MERS' favor should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings and trial. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder a 
Claim of Lien in the amount of $189,117.99 and then mailed to Barnson by certified mail a copy 
of the recorded document. Clerk's Record ("R"), p. 97 at fi 8. Following the commencement of 
this action, Bamson consented to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in the 
district court and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's favor against her, provided no 
award for damages was taken against her personally. R, p. 107. Based on this stipulation, the 
SAC was filed in the district court, and the district court then entered a final judgment against 
Barnson to the extent of her interest in the liened property, but notpevsonally, for the amounts 
pleaded in the SAC (the "Barnson Judgment"). R, pp. 106-08. The Barnson Judgment was 
neither appealed nor otherwise challenged in the proceedings before the district court. 
Nevertheless, in granting MERS' motion for summary judgment, the district court 
held (i) that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to substantially comply with the requirements of 
Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3)(a) and 45-507(4), R, pp. 125-26; (ii) that the contract on which 
the Barnson Judgment was based is void, R, pp. 130-31; and (iii) that, although ParkWest should 
"at the very least" have been entitled to recover for unjust enrichment, the issue of unjust 
enrichment was not before the district court, R, p. 13 1. ParkWest contends that the district court 
erred in all of its foregoing rulings. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7,2007, and, 
as a matter of course, filed its First Amended Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on 
September 12,2007. R, p. I. However, following the bankruptcy filing of Barnson, all 
proceedings were stayed by order entered February 27,2008, through September 4,2008, when 
ParkWest filed a motion for leave to file its SAC shortly after the dismissal of the Barnson 
bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The SAC was thereafter filed on October 6,2008, pursuant to order 
of the district court. R, p. 2. No answer was ever filed in this action by either Barnson or 
MERS. 
On September 29,2008, ParkWest filed a stipulation with counsel for Barnson 
consenting to the filing of the SAC and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's favor against 
Barnson, provided no award for damages was taken against her personally. R, pp. 2 and 107. In 
accordance with the terms of the stipulation, the district court entered final judgment against 
Barnson in ParkWest's favor on October 7,2008, for the total amount of $174,208.39. R, pp. 2 
and 106-08. 
MERS' motion for s nt filed October 2,2008, was argued to the 
district court on November 24,2008, and, on January 6, 2009, the district court entered its 
Memorandum Decision on Defendant Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Decision"). R, pp. 11 5-33. Judgment in favor of MERS was thereafter filed on 
January 26,2009. R, pp. 134-36. In accordance with I.A.R. 14(a), ParkWest timely filed its 
Notice of Appeal with respect to MERS' judgment on March 9,2009. R, pp. 137-40. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
On or about March 15,2006, Barnson and ParkWest entered into a contract (the 
"Contract") for ParkWest's construction of a two-story residence for Barnson on a lot located in 
Canyon County, Idaho (the "Property"), for the sum of $450,000. R, p. 96 (SAC ?If/ 2 and 6). 
Although ParkWest was not registered as a contractor by the State of Idaho when the Contract 
was executed, ParkWest (i) obtained its registration on May 2, 2006, (ii) obtained a building 
permit to construct the improvements to the Property on May 18,2006, and (iii) performed its 
first work in constructing the improvements to the Property on May 22,2006. R, p. 112 
(Affidavit of David Zawadzki ("Zawadzki Aff.") 5/ 3). Moreover, during the course of 
construction, Bamson requested that numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of 
the work be performed, which ParkWest undertook to do based on the assurances of Bamson that 
she would pay for such upgrades and additional work. R, pp. 96-97 (SAC 7 6). No 
compensation is being sought in this action by ParkWest for any work or other acts performed in 
connection with either the construction of the improvements to the Property or the performance 
of the Contract which were undertaken prior to ParkWest's registration as a contractor on May 2, 
2006. R, p. 112 (Zawadzki Aff. 14). 
Based on Barnson's failure to pay ParkWest for the work it performed in 
constructing her residence, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder on November 28, 
2006, its Claim of Lien. R, p. 97 (SAC 7 8). Those portions of the Claim of Lien relevant to the 
issues on appeal are set forth and signaled on the following page. 
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R, pp. 103-04 (SAC Ex. B) (signals added). 
Finally, after stipulating to both the filing of the SAC and the entry of a default 
judgment against her, the district court entered a final judgment against Barnson to the extent of 
her interest in the Property, but not personally, for the amounts pleaded in the SAC. R, p. 107. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in ruling that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to 
substantially comply with the requirements of Idaho Code Section 45-507? 
B. Did the district court err in ruling that the Contract is void? 
C. Did the district court err in ruling that the issue of unjust enrichment was 
not raised by the allegations pleaded in the SAC? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
All issues on appeal are subject to this court's free review. Thus, as summarized 
in Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 112 P.3d 825 (2005): 
Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). On review this Court construes the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Hardy 
v. McGill, 137 Idaho 280, 285,47 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002). Where 
there are no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law 
remains, and this Court exercises free review. Construction 
Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. ofAmerica, 135 Idaho 
680,682,23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). 
Nat ' I  Union Fire Ins. Co., 141 Idaho at 540, 112 P.3d at 828. 
B. The District Court Erred in Ruling That ParkWest's Claim of Lien Failed to 
Substantially Comply With the Requirements of Idaho Code Section 45-507. 
As recently reaffirmed in BMC JK Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 174 P.3d 399 
(2007): "Materialman's lien laws are construed liberally 'in favor of the person who performs 
labor upon or furnishes materials to be used in the construction of a building."' [Citation 
omitted.] "'To create a valid lien, there must be substantial compliance with the requirements of 
the statutes."' 144 Idaho at 893-94, 174 P.3d at 402-03 (quoting Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. 
Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 850,87 P.3d 955,959 (2004) (emphasis added)). In deciding MERS' 
motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to 
substantially comply with the requirements of both Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3)(a) and 
45-507(4) . ' R, pp. 124-26. These two grounds for invalidating ParkWest's lien are discussed in 
turn below. 
' Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3) and (4) provide, in their entirety, as follows: 
(3) The claim shall contain: 
(a) A statement of his demand, afker deducting all just 
credits and offsets; 
(b) The name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known; 
(c) The name of the personby whom he was employed or 
to whom he furnished the materials; and 
(d) A description of the property to be charged with the 
lien, sufficient for identification. 
(4) Such claim must be verified by the oath of the claimant, his 
agent or attorney, to the effect that the affiant believes the same to 
be just. 
1. The Claim of Lien substantially complies with the requirements of 
Section 45-507(3)(a). 
The district court ruled that ParkWest's Claim of Lien is invalid because Section 
45-507(3)(a) requires that it contain a "statement of [ParkWest's] demand, after deducting all 
just credits and offsets." R, pp. 125-26. As set forth above, however, the Claim of Lien contains 
the following express statement: 
?be sum of 0 0 0  bondred and eslgbiy-uinc lbouao~d one bondred and seventeen dollan, m d  nlaetJ 
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The Claim of Lien thus unequivocally contains a statement of ParkWest's demand. Moreover, 
there was no allegation or affirmative defense raised by any party to this action that ParkWest's 
Claim of Lien was not made "after deducting all just credits and offsets." The district court's 
ruling must therefore be based on the fact that the words "after deducting all just credits and 
offsets" are not included in the statement of ParkWest's demand. This purported deficiency was 
raised sua sponte by the district court when it issued its Decision and was neither discussed in 
either party's briefing nor addressed at the hearing on MERS' motion. Nor does the district 
court cite any authority holding that the words "after deducting all just credits and offsets" must 
be expressly included in a lien claimant's demand. 
The fact that ParkWest's statement of its claim was made "after deducting all just 
credits and offsets" is supported by the following undisputed facts: 
1. The Contract for Barnson's residence was in the amount of $450,000, and 
the constructed improvements were completed on November 1,2006. R, pp. 96-97 (SAC 
fill 6-71. 
2. The Claim of Lien recorded November 28,2006, was in the amount of 
$1 89,117.99, or less than half of the Contract price. R, p. 97 (SAC 7 8). 
3. ParkWest was not provided with documentation establishing Barnson's 
execution of an amendment to the Contract reducing the contract price (and lien claim) by 
$28,000 until after this action was filed. R, p. 98 (SAC 1[ 10). 
4. The Barnson Judgment was in the amount of $174,208.39. R, pp. 2 and 
107. Thus, after adjustment for the referenced amendment to the Contract, the amounts of the 
Claim of Lien and the Bamson Judgment are consistent. 
The starting point, of course, in determining what must be included in the Claim 
of Lien is the language of the controlling statute. And although Section 45-507(3)(a) expressly 
requires that the statement of ParkWest's demand be made "after deducting all just credits and 
offsets," nowhere does the statute require that a lien claim must explicitly state that it has been 
made after such deductions were effected. The recent decision in BMC W. Corp., supra, should 
control the resolution of the question on appeal. 
There, because "Kamachi, the agent of BMC, typed her name rather than signing 
it, Horkley argue[d] that the lien was not properly verified by oath." Id., 144 Idaho at 896, 174 
P.3d at 405. The court, however, rejected the argument holding as follows: 
Idaho Code 5 45-507 does not state that the lien must be signed; it 
only states that it must be verified by the oath of the claimant. 
Because Kamachi was given an oath by a notary public, and 
because a signatzlre is not explicit4 required, her typewritten 
name suffices. 
144 Idaho at 897, 174 P.3d at 406 (emphasis added). Accordingly, applying the foregoing 
holding to the present issue, because ParkWest's statement of its claim was in fact made "after 
deducting all just credits and offsets" and Section 45-507 does not explicitly require the 
foregoing quoted phrase to be included in a lien claim, ParkWest's Claim of Lien substantially 
complies with the requirements of the controlling statute. The district court therefore erred in 
ruling that the Claim of Lien fails to substantially comply with Section 45-507(3)(a). 
2. The Claim of Lien substantially complies with the requirements of 
Section 45-507(4). 
In issuing the only ruling on appeal that was made with respect to a question 
raised by MERS and therefore briefed and argued by the parties in the proceedings below, the 
district court ruled that parkwest's Claim of Lien is invalid because "it fails to contain any 
verification even 'remotely similar' to the one upheld in Treasure Valley Plumbing and 
He~ting."~ R, p. 126. As previously set forth, the Claim of Lien contains the following 
verification: 
Treasure Valley Plumbing &Heating, Inc. v. Earth Res. Co., 106 Idaho 920, 684 P.2d 
322 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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Or in sum, after expressly stating that the "undersigned" is "the Authorized Representative of the 
claimant of the foregoing mechanic's lien;" and that he has "read said mechanic's lien and 
know[s] the contents thereor' and that "the same is true of my knowledge": 
1. The Claim of Lien is executed by David Zawadzki "under penalty of 
perjury that the foregoing is true and correct"; 
2. Zawadzki's execution of the Claim of Lien is acknowledged by a notary 
public; and 
3. Zawadzki's execution and oath are verified by a notary public using the 
form specified in Idaho Code Section 51-109(2).) 
As with the prior issue discussed, the starting point in determining what must be 
included in the Claim of Lien is the language of the controlling statute, which specifies: "Such 
claim must be ver13ed by the oath of the claimant, his agent or attorney, to the effect that the 
affiant believes the same to be just." IDAHO CODE 5 45-507(4) (emphasis added). Thus, 
although Idaho Code Section 45-507(4) expressly requires that ParkWest's Claim of Lien be 
verified by the oath of ParkWest or its agent or attorney, nowhere does the statute require that the 
verification explicitly adhere to any specified form. 
Idaho Code Section 51-109(2) provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
(2) An oath or affirmation, which is in writing, shall be 
signed by the person who takes it, and the notary public shall enter 
thereunder substantially the following: 
"State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
Cou11ty of .  . . . ) 
Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this . . . . day 
of . . . . . . . . , . . . . .  
. . . . . . . (official signature and seal)" 
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code Section 18-5402 defines the tenn "oath" for purposes of perjury 
to include "an affirmation, and every other mode authorized by law of attesting the truth of that 
which is stated." Accord State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51,55,336 P.2d 318,320 (1959). See also 
67 C.J.S. Oaths and Affirmations 5 8 (2002)  he he elements of an oath include a solemn 
declaration, manifestation of intent to be bound by the statement, the signature of the declarer, 
and an acknowledgment by an authorized person that the oath was taken."). 
Also as with the prior issue discussed, the following holding in BMC W. Corp. 
should control the resolution of the question on appeal: 
[Slince Kamachi, the agent of BMC, typed her name rather than 
signing it, Horkley argues that the lien was not properly verified by 
oath. Idaho Code 5 45-507 requires that claims of lien "be verified 
by the oath of the claimant, his agent or attorney, to the effect that 
the affiant believes the same to be just." Black's Law Dictionary 
(8th ed.2004) defines "verification" as a 'yormal declaration 
made in the presence ofan authorized ofjcer, such as a notary 
public. . . . " Kamachi was "sworn upon oath" by a notary public. 
Idaho Code 8 45-507 does not state that the lien must be signed; it 
only states that it must be verified by the oath of the claimant. 
Because Kanlachi was given an oath by a notary public, and 
because a signature is not explicitly required, her typewritten name 
suffices. Kamachi's verification therefore was not defective. 
144 Idaho at 896-97, 174 P.3d at 405-06 (emphasis added). Accordingly, applying the foregoing 
holding to the present issue, because ParkWest's Claim of Lien was verified by the oath of its 
agent in a "formal declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary 
public . . ." and Section 45-507 does not explicitly require the verification to adhere to any 
specified form, Zawadzki's verification substantially complies with the requirements of the 
controlling statute. 
Although the district court quotes in its Decision much of the foregoing holding in 
BMC K Corp., see R, p. 123, the district court provides no rationale for why the holding in that 
case does not control the resolution of the present issue. Moreover, the district court's ruling that 
ParkWest's Claim of Lien is invalid because "it fails to contain any verification even 'remotely 
similar' to the one upheld in Treasure Valley Plumbing and Fleating" is substantively inaccurate. 
In Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, the court of appeals held that a valid 
verification existed where the certificate of the lien claimant's president recited that an oath had 
been administered and the claim was believed to be true and just, and the accompanying notary 
public's certificate contained "not merely a corporate acknowledgment but also a statement that 
the corporation's president 'did subscribe and swear to' the lien claim before the notary." 106 
Idaho at 922,684 P.2d at 324. In support of its holding "that these certificates taken together, 
constitute a verification" the court of appeals explained: "A vergcation is a '[~Jonfirmation of 
correctness, truth, or authenticity, by affidavit, oath, or deposition. "' Ibid (quoting BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, ParkWest 
respecthlly submits that Zawadzki's declaration made "under penalty of perjury that the 
foregoing is true and correct" coupled with the accompanying notary public's verification that 
the declaration had been "[sligned and sworn to" by Zawadzki constitutes a "verificalion" 
equally under both the definition contained in the revised fifth edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary, as cited and relied upon by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Treasure Valley Plmbdng 
aizd Heating, and the definition contained in the eighth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, as 
cited and relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in BMC W. Corp. The district court thus erred 
in ruling that Zawadzki's verification fails to substantially comply with Section 45-507(4). 
C.  The District Court Erred in Ruling That the Contract Is Void. 
The district court ruled that the Contract is void, "[slince PARKWEST, by its 
own admission, entered into a contract with BARNSON (thus, 'acted') before it complied with 
the requirements of the [Idaho Contractor Registration] Act4 . . . ." R, p. 130. As with the first 
question discussed above, this issue was raised sua sponte by the district court when it issued its 
Decision and was neither discussed in either party's briefing nor addressed at the hearing on 
MERS' motion. Accordingly, the district wurt did not consider ParkWest's contention that the 
Contract had been ratified by Barnson after ParkWest obtained registration as a contractor by the 
State of Idaho. 
As explained in Corbin on Contracts: 
Courts often state that a void contract cannot be ratified. 
Courts apply this principle to contracts involving public policy 
issues because, historically, courts viewed contracts deemed 
"illegal" as void contracts. Thus, the parties could not ratify these 
contracts. This is a correct rule so long as the applicable law has 
not changed and the facts remain the same. I f ;  however, a change 
has occurred such that the bargain, ifentered into at the later time, 
would be valid, a ratification at the later time may itselfconstitute 
an enforceable contract. Neither the making of such a bargain nor 
its performance is prohibited. All that is necessary is that the 
ratifying transaction shall itself fulfill ordinary contract 
requirements. 
15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBN ON CONTRACTS, Contracts Contvaly to Public Policy 
3 89.14 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Accord 17A 
C.J.S. Contracts 3 287(a) (1999). 
The relevant facts supporting Barnson's "subsequent" ratification of the Contract 
are set forth above as follows: 
1. Although ParkWest was not registered as a contractor by the State of 
Idaho when the Contract was executed, ParkWest (a) obtained its registration on May 2, 2006, 
(b) obtained a building permit to construct the improvements to the Property on May 18,2006, 
and (c) performed its first work in constructing the improvements to the Property on May 22, 
2006. 
2. During the course of construction, Barnson requested that numerous 
upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of the work be performed, which ParkWest 
undertook to do based on the assurances of Barnson that she would pay for such upgrades and 
additional work. 
3. No compensation is being sought in this action by ParkWest for any work 
or other acts performed in connection with either the construction of the improvements to the 
Property or the performance of the Contract which were undertaken prior to ParkWest's 
registration as a contractor on May 2, 2006. 
4. After Bamson stipulated to both the filing of the SAC and the entry of a 
default judgment against her, the district court entered a final judgment against Bamson to the 
extent of her interest in the Property, but notpersonally, for the amounts pleaded in the SAC. 
Although neither of Idaho's appellate courts appears to have addressed the 
question here presented, the general rules with respect to "ratification" are summarized in Corpus 
Juris Secondum as follows: 
Ratification of a contract may be found under a variety of 
circumstances, such as intentionally accepting benefits under the 
contract after discovery of facts that would warrant rescission, 
remaining silent or acquiescing in the contract for a period of time 
after having the opportunity to avoid it, or recognizing the validity 
of the contract by acting upon it, performing under it, or 
affirmatively acknowledging it. 
17A C.J.S. Contracts 5 138 (1999) (footnotes omitted). CJ: Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & 
Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47,55, 830 P.2d 1185, 1193 (1992) (summarizing the doctrine of implied 
ratification by a principal in a contract setting). Therefore, based on the rule that the record must 
be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, "drawing all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor," Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 
ParkWest submits that Barnson ratified the Contract ajku ParkWest obtained registration as a 
contractor by the State of Idaho. Any other ruling would allow Bamson to avoid obligations she 
assumed in connection with inducing ParkWest, which was then duly registered as a contractor, 
into both making numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of the work it 
performed at her request and settling its claims against Bamson-and releasing her personally- 
in exchange for her stipulation to ParkWest's lien in the Property, as pleaded in the SAC. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling sua sponte that the Contract is void. 
D. The District Court Erred in Ruling That the Issue of Unjust Enrichment 
Was Not Raised by the Allegations Pleaded in the SAC. 
In connection with ruling that the Contract is void, the district court 
acknowledged that, "[alt the very least, PARKWEST should have been entitled to a recovery 
based upon unjust enrichment." R, p. 131 (citing Barry v. Pac. W. Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
833, 103 P.3d 440,446 (2004)). "Nevertheless," as the district court went on to rule, "that issue 
is not before the court." R, p. 131. The determination of whether the issue was then before the 
court was also made sua sponte by the district court, with neither party raising the issue in its 
briefing nor addressing it at the hearing on MERS' motion. Nor does the district court cite any 
authority or include any analysis in its Decision supporting its ruling. 
The pleading requirements under 1daho law are articulated in Seiniger Law Office, 
P.A. v. N. Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008), as follows: 
Generally, a claim for relief need contain only "a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief. . . . " I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Under notice pleading, "a party is no 
longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its 
pleadings." Cookv. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 
864 (2000) (citation omitted). A complaint need only state claims 
upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 34, 13 P.3d at 865. A 
party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a just, 
speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case. Vendelin v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp.., 140 Idaho 416,427,95 P.3d 34,45 (2004) 
(citations omitted). The emphasis is to insure that a just result is 
accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms 
of pleading. Id. "The key issue in determining the validity of a 
complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the 
claims brought against it." Id. 
145 Idaho at 246-47, 178 P.3d at 61 1-12. See also Cafferty v. State, Dept. of Transp., 144 Idaho 
324, 328, 160 P.3d 763, 777 (2007) ("A complaint need only contain a concise statement of facts 
constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief." (citation omitted)). 
In this regard, although ParkWest specifically pleads the existence of its lien 
against the Property and seeks a decree of foreclo~ure,~ nowhere in the SAC does ParkWest 
specify or limit the particular legal theories on which its claim is based. Rather, in accordance 
' Indeed, the SAC'S h l l  title is "Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien." R, 
p. 95. 
with the foregoing pleading requirements, ParkWest set forth the following concise statement of 
facts constituting its claim: 
6. On or about March 15,2006, Barnson, as "Owner," and 
ParkWest, as "Contractor," entered into a contract for ParkWest's 
construction of a two-story residence (the "Residence") on the 
Property for the sum of $450,000. Thereafter, Barnson requested 
that numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of 
the work be performed, which ParkWest undertook to do based on 
the assurances of Barnson that she would pay for such upgrades 
and additional work. Such requested changes, together with 
Barnson's delay in making numerous decisions and selections 
reasonably required for the construction work to progress, resulted 
in substantial increased costs to and work by ParkWest for which it 
is entitled to be paid by Barnson. Additionally, pursuant to the 
terms of the parties' construction contract, Barnson agreed to pay 
interest at the rate of 18% per annum on amounts not paid within 
five days after request for payment was made. As a result of the 
foregoing, ParkWest reasonably estimated and believed that 
Barnson owed ParkWest the approximate sum of $189,117.99 as 
of November 1,2006. 
8. Based on Barnson's failure to pay ParkWest for the 
foregoing referenced work, upgrades, changes, delays, and interest, 
ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder on 
November 28,2006, a Claim of Lien in the amount of $189,117.99 
and mailed to Barnson by certified mail a copy of the recorded 
Claim of Lien on November 30,2006. Copies of the referenced 
Claim of Lien and proof of receipt are attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
10. Because, among other reasons, ParkWest was not provided 
until after this action was filed with documentation establishing 
Barnson's execution of a contract amendment she had requested 
reducing the contract sum to $422,000 or with the amounts paid on 
ParkWest's behalf by Barnson's construction lender to 
subcontractors, materialmen, or others with respect to the 
Residence, ParkWest had no way of determining the actual amount 
owed by Barnson to ParkWest for its construction of the Residence 
prior to the time it filed its Claim of Lien. However, based on 
discovery undertaken and documentation obtained by ParkWest in 
the bankruptcy proceedings, Barnson owed ParkWest the sum of 
$141,208.39 as of November 1,2006. 
R, pp. 96-98 (SAC 77 6,  8, and lo). 
Because the foregoing factual statement fully supports ParkWest's recovery under the 
alternative legal theories of unjust enrichmentG or quantum meruit7 should the Contract be illegal 
and void,s the district court also erred inruling sua sponte that the issue of unjust enrichment was 
not raised by the allegations pleaded in the SAC. See, e.g., Seiniger Law O@ce, P.A., supra. 
' See Barry, 140 Idaho at 834, 103 P.3d at 447 ("Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the 
measure of recovery under a contract implied in law. A contract implied in law, or quasi- 
contract, 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing 
about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties . . . ."' 
(citations omitted)). 
See Barry, 140 Idaho at 834, 103 P.3d at 447 ("quantum meruit is the appropriate 
recovery under a contract implied in fact. A contract implied in fact exists where there is no 
express agreement but the parties conduct evidences an agreement." (citation omitted)). 
Although in Barry the plaintiff was limited in its recovery to unjust enrichment, the 
policy considerations suppofting the plaintiffs recovery in that case to restitution are not here 
applicable. See Barry, 140 Idaho at 833-34, 103 P.3d at 446-47. Thus, if the Contract was not 
ratified by Barnson, quantum meruit should inure because (a) all of the work performed by 
ParkWest was undertaken after it obtained registration as a contractor by the State of Idaho and 
(b) the parties' post-registration conduct evidences their agreement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the judgment in MERS' favor 
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings and trial. 
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